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HAWAIIAN QUESTION. 



1 



SPEECH 






HON. FRANCIS G. NEWLANDS, 



OF NEVADA, 



IN THE 



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 



june: 3, 1 89 



WASHINGTON. 
I898. 



J 









v 



23 



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Hawaiian Annexation— Territorial Expansion, 



SPEECH 

OF 

HON. FRANCIS G. NEWLANDS. 



The House having under consideration the joint resolution (H. Res. 259) t© 
provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States- 
Mr. NEWLANDS said: 

Mr. Speaker: I shall not enter into the question of the consti- 
tutional power invoked by the opponents of Hawaiian annexation. 
I shall assume that the United States has all the powers of sover- 
eignty; that it is not to-day prepared to deny the legality or the 
constitutionality of the processes by which its territory has grown 
from 800,000 square miles to 3,600,000 square miles; that it is not 
prepared to-day to contest the validity of the acquisition of 
Florida, the acquisition of Louisiana, involving the control of the 
Mississippi and the Missouri valleys, the acquisition of Texas, the 
acquisition of New Mexico and Upper California, the acquisition 
of the great intermountain region between the Rockies and the 
Sierra Nevadas, or the acquisition of Alaska. 

I shall assume that if it can acquire continental territory it can 
acquire insular territory. I shall assume that if it can acquire the 
island of Key West, off the coast of Florida, it can acquire Hawaii, 
off the coast of California. I shall assume that if it can acquire 
Alaska, 1,500 miles away by land, it can acquire Hawaii, 2,200 
miles away by sea; that if it can acquire the Aleutian Islands, 
stretching 500 miles west of the Hawaiian, it can acquire the 
Hawaiian Islands, 500 miles east of the Aleutian; that if it can 
acquire territory by the accident of war, it can acquire it by the 
deliberation of peace; that if it can acquire territory by dis- 
covery, by violence, by conquest, and by treaty, it can acquire 
territory by gift, accepted by solemn enactment of law in which 
both branches of Congress and the President concur. 

I take it that the question of constitutional power is foreclosed 
by the action of one hundred years, and that the only question to 
be determined is one of policy, expediency, and good judgment. 

DANGERS Or TERRITORIAL EXPANSION. 

We are told that avarice is the besetting sin of nations as well 
as of individuals; that the pathway of history is strewn with the 
graves of nations driven by lust of power and avarice of territory 
into a ruinous expansion, destructive of liberty, destructive of 
simplicity, destructive of morals, and destructive of virility. 

We are told that to grow means danger, and that to dwarf one's 
growth means safety. We are told that the Hawaiian Islands mean 
empire, colonial expansion, centralization of power, to be followed 
by decentralization and destruction; that their acquisition means 
the beginning of the end. The accidental occupation of Manila, 
3132 3 



involving possibly the acquisition of the Philippine Islands, ac- 
centuates alarm and creates the fear that a proposition intended 
only to secure territorial defense and commercial security is the 
stepping-stone to a policy of imperial aggrandizement. 

HOW OUR COUNTRY HAS GROWN. 

I shall not attempt to follow the historic parallels which the 
gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Clark] has so eloquently drawn. 
I know nothing more deceptive than historic parallels. It is 
true, Mr. Speaker, that nations, like individuals, have their in- 
fancy, their manhood, their old age, and death. It is true that 
nations must grow and must decline. It is true that governments 
that have grown into empires have become extinct. It is also 
true that governments that have not grown into empires have be- 
come extinct. 

Was expansion the cause of the death of the one and non- 
expansion the cause of the death of the other? If phenomenal 
growth is a sure sign of early decay, then the seeds of dissolution 
are already planted in this Government, for we have grown in one 
century from 800,000 to 3,600,000 square miles. Our present area 
is nearly five times as great as that occupied by the Republic in 
its infancy. 

Was it desire for empire and lust of territory, or was it accident, 
or was it a high and benficent purpose that led to this enlarge- 
ment of our territory? There was no need of additional territory 
to meet the requirements of our population. The entire popu- 
lation of to-day could be put into the thirteen original States 
without overcrowding them. Part of this territory was acquired 
by war, part by negotiation and purchase, but it must be con- 
ceded that the central idea was to rectify our boundaries, to ex- 
tend our western frontier and remove European powers from 
possession of contiguous territory, and to separate us by oceans, 
gulfs, lakes, and rivers from possible enemies whose proximity 
would necessitate the maintenance of large military establish- 
ments as a means of defense. 

And so we expanded under the conviction that our boundary 
on the south should be the Gulf of Mexico and the Rio Grande, on 
the east the Atlantic, on the west the Pacific, and on the north 
the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes; and later on, foreseeing 
that, by the process of peaceful evolution, Canada might become 
a part of our Union, Alaska was acquired as the only other foreign 
possession between our territory and the Polar Sea. 

Our country was to be a great commercial union of States, 
bound together in such a way as to secure them from external 
foes and from external conditions of adversity. There were to be 
no custom-houses at boundary lines to restrain interstate trade; 
no standing armies for offense or defense against neighboring 
States. Relief was to be given from militarism, and the produc- 
tive power of the Union was to be increased by pursuing the arts 
of peace. 

But whilst the States were thus to be free from military con- 
tention as amongst themselves, the nation was to be made strong 
for defense. This involved the establishment of a scientific bound- 
ary and a territorial grant based not on lust of empire, but on 
patriotic determination to strengthen our defensive line and to 
secure the prosperity and happiness, the peace, safety, and welfare 
of a great people. 



INSULAR EXPANSION. 

Whilst these acquisitions were mainly continental and, with the 
exv?ption of Alaska, contiguous, the very purpose of territorial 
defense necessarily involved the peaceful acquisition of islands 
adjacent to our coast which could be made the basis of naval or 
military attack, and which, in the possession of strong European 
powers, would constitute a constant menace to our coast. 

Had our forefathers contemplated the vast territorial expan- 
sion since achieved they would doubtless have regarded the ac- 
quisition of the Bahamas and the West Indies as important. 
They would have realized that those islands would control access 
to the Gulf of Mexico and would bar the way to the Nicaragua 
Canal sometime to be built and owned by this country, and they 
would have felt that the possession of those islands by the great 
powers of England, Spain, and France might be as hazardous to 
our peaceful isolation and our commercial supremacy as the occu- 
pation of contiguous continental territory. 

Could they have foreseen the growth of naval power they would 
have realized that foreign aggression would take the form, not so 
much of invasion by military force, but of naval attack on our 
merchant-marine engaged in the coast trade and upon our coast 
cities, and that such an attack could not be successfully made 
without convenient coaling stations such as these islands afforded. 
The very policy which embraced the acquisition of contiguous con- 
tinental territory ought also to have embraced the acquisition of 
the adjacent islands, whose annexation would increase the dis- 
tances between us and possible foes. 

In enlarging our boundaries, one of the legitimate objects to be 
obtained was to secure the outposts beyond our defensive line, 
the possession of which by a hostile power would make its attack 
more effective. 

The recent operations of the Spanish fleet from the Cape Verde 
and Canary Islands as bases, a movement which created alarm 
and apprehension along our entire coast, demonstrated the value 
in war of a naval station even so distant. It demonstrated that 
an attacking fleet can be more effective than a defensive fleet with 
a long coast line to protect, for the attacking fleet knows the point 
it intends to attack whilst the defensive fleet must scatter its 
energies along an entire coast. 

It has been fortunate that our first modern experience of war- 
fare with European powers has been with the weakest of the sec- 
ond-class powers — a country bankrupt in resources, corrupt in 
government, and inefficient in action. No pen could picture the 
result had Spain been a first-class naval power, with the Canary 
Islands, Puerto Rico, and Cuba as bases of supplies and attack. 

Geographically the Bahamas and the West Indies belong to this 
country as a part of its defensive line, but owned, as they are, by 
great powers, the task of acquisition will be difficult and, with 
their large population of half-breed and inferior races, may be un- 
desirable. But if these islands had only the limited population 
of Hawaii to-day and should be freely offered to this country as a 
gift, the statesman who would successfully oppose their acquisi- 
tion would be execrated by posterity. 

I contend, then, that the vast acquisitions made by this country 
have strengthened rather than weakened it; have diminished the 
chances and opportunities for militarism, have minimized the 

3132 



6 

chances of continental wars, have increased our capacity for de- 
fense, and have secured the development of an empire dedicated 
to civilization, good order, good government, and peace. I con- 
tend that the reasoning which led to these acquisitions applies to 
the islands near our Atlantic coast, though I admit that present 
conditions render their acquisition impossible and, perhaps, unde- 
sirable, and that their number makes the task of complete defen- 
sive isolation difficult. 

PACIFIC COAST. 

But how is it with our Pacific coast? Can we secure there ad- 
vantages regarding the possession of adjacent islands which we 
have failed to secure on the Atlantic coast? We have there a coast 
line, including Alaska, twice as great as that of our Atlantic coast. 
Between Alaska and our States lie the British possessions. The 
Pacific Ocean is nearly three times as wide as the Atlantic Ocean. 
We already bound it on the west and north. What confronts us on 
the Asiatic coast? Japan, a rising military and naval power, pos- 
sessing to-day a navy superior to our own, spirited, self-assertive, 
and aggressive. 

What other powers? Russia, reaching out for the ocean, deter- 
mined to obtain an outlet to increase its maritime power, Eng- 
land, France, and Germany all contending over the division of 
the Chinese Empire. On the Asiatic coast the great navies of the 
world will be concentrated. The contest of the future will be 
over the commerce of the Pacific Ocean. Are there any islands 
off our Pacific coast like the West Indies or the Bahamas in the 
possession of foreign naval powers? No; the islands of the North- 
ern Pacific are few, not many. From San Francisco to Hong- 
kong, a distance of 7,000 miles; from the Aleutian Islands to the 
Tropics, a distance of about 5,000 miles, lie the scarcely populated 
Hawaiian Islands — 2,200 miles from San Francisco and 4,900 miles 
from Hongkong— possessing a limited soil of great fertility, unsur- 
passed climate, and an incomparable harbor. 

These are the only islands that it would be necessary for us to 
acquire, for whilst they are not so near to our Pacific coast as the 
Bahamas and West Indies to our Atlantic coast, they are near 
enough to form the base of attack by a hostile power, and they are 
the only islands adjacent to California from which such an attack 
could be made. Distance is relative. Recollect that the Atlantic 
is much narrower than, the Pacific. We might well hesitate to 
attempt to secure all the islands in the Atlantic Ocean near our 
coast because of the hopelessness of the task. We might be de- 
terred from it by reason of the fact that the European coast itself 
is not so far distant as to make a successful naval attack by a 
European power impossible. 

But recollect that the Pacific Ocean is so wide as to make a 
naval attack from the Asiatic coast impossible without recoaling, 
and the Hawaiian Islands offer the only facilities for that purpose. 
The Hawaiian Islands are eight in number, with a population of 
109,000 people. The two existing harbors of Honolulu and Oahu 
are incapable of economical defense, but Pearl Harbor, 9 miles from 
Honolulu, is capable of being so fortified at small expense as to 
defy the navies of the world without the aid of a supporting navy. 
It is a large lagoon, landlocked, except on the ocean side, to which 
access is barred by a coral reef through which a drift can be 
easily made. 

3432 



When made, the harbor could float the navies of the world, and 
yet the narrow approach to it could he so protected by mines and 
fortifications as to enable it to defy the navies of the world. In 
its defensive capacity it resembles the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, 
which to-day, though protected by inferior fortifications, holds at 
bay our entire Navy. It could only be taken by a land attack, 
and the troops necessary to attack it would have to be brought 
nearly 5,000 miles from the Asiatic coast. 

It is estimated that the expenditure of half a million dollars 
would adequately fortify and protect this harbor, and that a reg- 
iment of men would be a sufficient defensive force, except, perhaps, 
in times of war. It would be invulnerable from the sea. A land 
attack would be almost impossible because of the long distance 
by ocean to be traversed by an attacking army. 

One regiment of the Regular Army, aided by a militia composed 
of the resident population of whites and Kanakas, could success- 
fully resist any attacking force without other aid. General Scho- 
field states that during our late war many Kanakas served in the 
Union Army and that they made excellent soldiers. 

What elements of weakness, then, attach to these islands as a 
defensive outpost of our coast? Will Pearl Harbor require a 
large defensive navy? No; it can protect itself. Will a large 
occupying army be required? No ; the resident militia, aided by 
a regiment of regulars will meet every requirement. 

In case of attack aimed by some great power from the Asiatic 
coast we would send soldiers and ships to Hawaii for additional 
defense, but how much better to concentrate a small force there 
than to scatter a large force along our entire Pacific coast, to 
increase fortifications, to increase warships, and to prepare for 
the general defense of a long line of many thousand miles, leav- 
ing defenseless Hawaii to be captured by the attacking power, 
and used as an effective means of raiding our entire coast from 
the Aleutian Islands to San Diego. Admiral Walker says that 
we could fortify the Hawaiian Islands for less money that it would 
take to build one battle ship. 

With Hawaii as a base, Spain, if in possession of a sufficient 
naval power, could destroy our merchant marine on the Pacific 
coast, capture our ships returning from Alaska with gold, and 
keep the entire coast in an agony of apprehension. Without Ha- 
waii no naval power could aim an attack on us from the Asiatic 
coast, as recoaling would be difficult, if not impracticable. What 
navy would be guilty of the folly of starting from Hongkong for 
an attack upon our Pacific coast, 7,000 miles away, relying only 
upon colliers for additional supply? A storm might scatter them: 
an attacking force might sink them. Numerous contingencies 
might occur creating disadvantage for the attacking navy and 
advantage for the defensive navy. With these islands in our pos- 
session no hostile attacking force could reach our Pacific coast 
from the Asiatic coast, and costly military and naval protection 
would be unnecessary. Without these islands costly coast forti- 
fications and a large navy would be required for coast defense. 

DANGER OF OCCUPATION. 

We are told that there is no danger of the occupancy of these 

islands by any strong power. Our answer is that they have been 

occupied three times in the last century by stronger powers. The 

Hawaiian Republic is incapable of resisting aggression. It lacks 

3433 



8 

the population and the wealth necessary to defend itself against 
a strong naval or military power. These islands must fall into 
the hands of some strong power, or else, with an increasing Jap- 
anese population, internal revolution and Japanese control are 
imminent. 

The process of assimilation caused by an influx of Japanese 
might result in peaceful Japanese control. Can we afford to let 
these islands drift into the possession of any strong European 
power? Can we permit. them, through the action of existing 
internal forces, to drift under the control of Japan, that rising 
power of the Orient, possessing to-day a navy superior to our 
own— a nation strong, self-assertive, aggressive, reaching out 
for power? In case Hawaii, discarded by us, is willing to seek 
the support of some stronger power, could we object? Such 
objection would be insufferable arrogance on our part after 
having refused their annexation. 

PROTECTORATE. 

We are told that a protectorate is the thing. Will any reason- 
able man contend that we can protect unless the people of Hawaii 
ask for protection? And suppose they signify their desire to be 
incorporated into the system of some stronger power, what becomes 
of our protectorate? How can we guarantee their independence 
if they do not wish to be independent? How can we protect them 
if they do not wish to be protected? 

Assuming, however, that they desire to be protected, how can 
we incur the obligation of protecting them without the right to 
control their action? If we control their action, that means gov- 
ernment — equivalent to annexation. If we do not control their 
action, can anyone conjecture what international complications 
may result from their arrogance, their indiscretion, or their ag- 
gressiveness produced by a sense of security? 

SIMPLY A TERMINABLE RIGHT TO PEARL HARBOR. 

But we are told that we already own Pearl Harbor and it would 
be better for us to fortify it and improve it as a coaling station 
Without incurring the obligation of governing the Hawaiian Is- 
lands. Would it be wise to run the risk of having a hostile popu- 
lation immediately surrounding the harbor with its fortifications? 
The island would without doubt drift under Mongolian con- 
trol. Could we rely upon their friendliness in case of war? For 
purely strategic purposes it would doubtless be better if Pearl 
Harbor were bounded by rocks without population. But are the 
disadvantages of acquiring the existing population of Hawaii suf- 
ficient to counterbalance the advantages gained from having a 
patriotic and friendly population surrounding the key to the 
Pacific? The disadvantages are much exaggerated. The popu- 
lation consists of about 20,000 whites, 30,000 Kanakas, 20,000 Chi- 
nese, 40,000 Japanese. The whites consist of Americans, English, 
and Portuguese, ail of whom can be easily assimilated. 

The Kanakas are a very kindly, intelligent race, gradually be- 
coming extinct. The Chinese and Japanese are there, as a rule, 
without families, under contract. They are devoted to their own 
country, and intend some time returning there. The existing 
Mongolian population, therefore, will necessarily be withdrawn, 
and under wise exclusion laws there will be none to take its place. 
The population of Hawaii will necessarily, therefore, be increased 

1432 



9 

by emigration from our own country to islands possessing a lim- 
ited but fertile soil and an incomparable climate, and thus by the 
peaceful processes of emigration from our own country the entire 
character of the population will be changed. The present popula- 
tion is friendly to America. 

This movement had its source in the establishment of American 
missions in the early part of the century. It involves no wrench, 
no violence. As the President states it, it is a consummation, not 
a change. The Government is to-day practically American; the 
people will easily glide into our governmental system. They are 
now practically a part of our industrial system. 

But is it true that we have any perpetual rights in Pearl Har- 
bor? Our rights there are secured by a reciprocity treaty termi- 
nable at the will of either party. There is nothing in the language 
to indicate that a perpetual right is granted, and the history of 
the transaction shows that there was no such intention. 

When the reciprocity treaty was renewed, the Senate of the 
United States inserted, in addition to the existing provisions for 
the admission of certain American products free of duty into Ha- 
waii and the admission of certain Hawaiian products free of duty 
into America, a clause giving to American vessels the exclusive 
right to enter Pearl Harbor, and giving the United States the 
right to improve the harbor for such purposes. 

Nothing was said as to the time or duration of the privilege, 
and inferentially the term of the privilege was coincident with the 
term of the other reciprocal privileges in the treaty, and when the 
Hawaiian minister, before signing it as amended wrote a letter to 
Secretary Bayard stating that such was his construction of the 
clause, that the privilege as to Pearl Harbor was terminable at the 
will of either party, Mr. Bayard, our Secretary of State, acqui- 
esced in his construction. 

With this history would it not be brutal in us to terminate the 
treaty, as is insisted by the opponents of annexation (for their real 
purpose is to exclude Hawaiian sugar from our country) , and at 
the same time to claim the permanent right to the harbor? How 
could we justify such an act of aggression? Is any power given 
to us to fortify this harbor? No. Do we own a foot of territory 
there? No. Have we any jurisdiction over the harbor itself? 
No. To fortify this harbor and to land our forces there would be 
an invasion of Hawaiian soil. To attempt to administer our laws 
within the boundaries of Pearl Harbor would be practically gov- 
erning a part of the islands instead of governing the whole. 

It can not be taken for granted that Hawaii will give to this 
country her most valuable possession when we discard all the rest. 
The purpose of Hawaii is to obtain security, protection, peace, 
and good government. Can we deny all this and at the same 
time seize her only effective harbor of defense and hold it as our 
own? 

ALEUTIAN ISLANDS. 

Now we are met by the statement that it is unnecessary to 
acquire Hawaii because we have already acquired the Aleutian 
Islands farther to the west, as there is in these islands an admir- 
able harbor, the name of which, I believe, is Kiska. I am not 
informed as to the character, importance, or value of that harbor, 
nor am I informed as to the feasibility of the tortuous route 
suggested, nor as to the condition of the currents and other 



10 

matters that oftentimes make the shortest route in distance the 
longest in time; bnt admitting all the gentleman from Arkansas 
[Mr. Dinsmore] claims regarding it, admitting that it is nearer 
to go from San Francisco to the north and then to the south in 
order to reach Hongkong and the Philippine Islands, admitting 
that Kiska is an admirable harbor, I ask, Does that fact minimize 
the importance of securing the only other harbor in that vast 
expanse of ocean which can be utilized either for the purposes of 
war or of commerce? 

And while we attach so much importance to the defensive as- 
pect of this station, are we lightly to consider the commercial ad- 
vantages involved in having the halfway station from our Pacific 
coast to the Orient, the halfway station from China to the future 
Nicaragua Canal? So I contend that as a matter of defense to our 
coast, as a matter of pursuing legitimately the lines which the 
country has so steadily pursued, of rectifying its boundaries, of se- 
curing scientific boundaries that will protect from foreign aggres- 
sion and minimize the necessity of militarism, we should acquire 
these islands which lie adjacent to California, and that the dis- 
tance makes no difference. The question is whether they are at 
such a distance as effectively to be used by a hostile power; and 
it makes no difference whether they are 100 miles from San Fran- 
cisco or 2,200 miles, provided they can be so used. 

As I have already said, we have seen the effectiveness of a 
movement inaugurated by a hostile and bankrupt country, from 
a base of operations 2,500 miles from our coast. How effective 
would Hawaii be as the base of operations of the great power of 
Germany or Russia in dominating our entire coast, raiding it from 
the Aleutian Islands to San Diego, intercepting our ships as they 
come down with the gold from Alaska, destroying our entire 
merchant marine, darting in here and there with an effectiveness 
that would necessitate ample military and naval defense all along 
the line. And here we have a long coast on the Pacific, twice as 
long as that on the Atlantic, and we hesitate to avail ourselves of 
the only harbor which, in hostile hands, would constitute a menace 
to our safety. 

COLONIAL EXPANSION. 

But we are confronted by the statement that the acquisition of 
the Hawaiian Islands means colonial expansion, territorial ex- 
pansion, empire. I regard it as an unfortunate thing that this 
question is to be considered in the public mind in connection with 
the Philippine question. None of us know how that question 
is to be determined. For one I trust that it will not be so de- 
termined as to involve colonial expansion. 

I do not believe in owning islands all over the globe; I do not 
believe in a system of colonial extension like that of England. 
Different nations must pursue different lines of expansion and 
growth. A country that is built up and overpopulated as Eng- 
land is must, in order to maintain its prosperity, its growth and 
its strength, acquire additional territory. "The policy of an island 
limited in area like that of England, and having a population of 
vigorous and aggressive people should be entirely different from 
the policy of a country that has more territory than population, 
and which should be absorbed in internal problems, not external 
problems. 

The relation which such a population as the Philippines will 



11 

have to our own, both as to individual liberty, individual repre- 
sentation, and industrial and commercial laws will be so perplex- 
ing as to distract us from the consideration of the grave internal 
problems that confront us. The acquisition of such a population 
may entirely break down and destroy our industrial system, based 
upon protection and intended to protect the American laborer 
from the disastrous competition of the cheap labor of other coun- 
tries. Whether this is desirable or not may be a matter of con- 
tention, but that the immediate effects of it might be a most 
serious readjustment of industrial and economic conditions, in- 
volving distress and suffering to our existing population, must be 
considered. 

I am therefore against colonial expansion for this country. I 
am for territorial defense. I should have regarded our position 
as stronger to-day had Dewey met the Spanish fleet in the open 
sea and destroyed it and then sailed to Cuba, there to unite his 
forces with Sampson's and Schley's. I believe in concentration 
of action, not diffusion of action. I believe in steadily keeping in 
mind the purpose with which we started, which was to drive the 
Spaniards from Cuba. Involved in that was the destruction of 
the Spanish navy wherever found, for through the Spanish navy 
alone could an effective defense of Cuba be made. 

Dewey's brilliant victory placed Manila at his feet. He was 
true to the military instinct in holding his ground and taking 
possession of the islands as a pledge of security and peace. 
But the problems with reference to those islands are to be settled 
hereafter by wise statesmanship. It may be that we have so com- 
plicated ourselves with the insurgent chief there, with the insur- 
gent forces that are now arrayed against Spain and are wresting 
from her by land the possession of her fortifications, that honor 
and a proper regard for the respect of mankind will demand from 
us the task of pacifying the islands and organizing a stable and 
civilized government there. 

I would not have the United States unresponsive to any hon- 
orable obligation. I would even run the risk of mistakes in our 
foreign policy rather than do that. But these are questions for 
the future, serious questions, involving possible acquisition of 
9,000,000 people of inferior races, not suited for our civilization, 
not suited for assimilation with us. Their acquisition involves 
not territorial defense, not peace, but aggression, conquest, war, 
international complications. It puts us in the theater of action 
of the great nations of the world and may force us to participate 
with them in all the diplomatic controversies that may arise. 

But no such disadvantages attach to the Hawaiian Islands. The 
population which we add is inconsiderable. The country has 
already, by the peaceful process of evolution, assimilated itself 
with us. For years it has been practically American. American 
ideas, American liberty, American civilization, prevail there. No 
violent wrench is involved in their acquisition. No difficult prob- 
lem of colonial expansion is involved in adding a population of 
109,000 people, 50,000 of whom will retire to their old homes 
within the next five or ten years, leaving the island for the pos- 
session of the Caucasian race. No difficult problems of agricul- 
tural competition present themselves, for the soil, though rich, is 
limited and has probably reached its largest development. 

I admit that the Philippine question is one of great difficulty. 
It may involve a readjustment of our entire industrial system. 

3432 



12 

We have thus far promoted commercial union between the States, 
done away with custom-houses between them, done away with all 
restraints upon friendship and commerce. We have built up 
around our country, by the action of both parties, the defensive 
wall of the tariff to protect our industries and the wage earners 
employed in them against the cheap labor of other countries and 
adverse conditions elsewhere. 

If it were proposed to-day to add Japan and the Chinese Empire 
to the United States and to place our protective wall around them 
all, would New England assent? It would mean the injury and 
perhaps destruction of every manufacturing enterprise in that 
section, for the tendency, of course, is for every such enterprise 
to drift to the point of cheapest production. 

We, in a measure, protect our laboring people against the cheap 
labor of Europe and also against the cheaper labor of the Mongo- 
lian races by our tariff laws; but there is not an intelligent man 
who does not realize to-day that the great industrial nations of 
the future are likely to be Japan and China, and if they were in- 
corporated within our domain and surrounded by this tariff wall 
we would find our industries transplanted from our own soil to 
theirs. 

As it is, the energies of hundreds of millions of people in China 
of great industrial aptness are to be loosened, and those energies 
are to be directed by the great powers of Europe— England, 
France, Germany, and Russia. We shall feel the force of their 
competition. 

Bear in mind the change that is now going on in the cotton in- 
dustry. That industry is being gradually transferred from New 
England to the South. Why? Because labor is cheaper in the 
South, because the hours of labor are longer, because there are 
not the same restrictions as to child labor. 

We have numerous problems to meet within this tariff wall of 
ours, problems that involve social questions, the consolidation of 
capital, the consolidation of labor, the condition of the laboring 
classes. The time will probably come when, by a constitutional 
amendment, the hours of labor will be regulated in all the States 
by the Congress of the United States, when the question of child 
lal o: will be regulated by the laws of the United States, for the 
contention will be made by the laboring classes in those States 
subject to wise, just, and reasonable restraint as to the hours of 
labor that other States not subject to such restraint are absorb- 
ing their industries. 

How would it be with reference to Japan and China, if those 
Empires were attached to us? How will it be with the Philip- 
pine Islands if they are attached to us and our industrial system 
is applied to them? It will be hard for us to apply the rule of 
justice and equality to those possessions without inflicting a serious 
injury on our own people. 

But recollect that Hawaii has already come within the scope of 
our industrial system by the reciprocity treaty. Already she is a 
part of our industrial system. There is no wrench, no violence. 
This process of acquiring Hawaii is simply the peaceful process of 
evolution. 

I think, then, with all due deference to the opinions of my friends 
on this side, that they should draw the distinction between an im- 
perial policy and this question, between colonial extension and 
territorial defense. It will not do to oppose a just measure on the 

3132 



- 13 

score that it may hereafter lead to an indefensible measure. Yoke 
a just measure with an indefensible measure, and they may both 
go through. Settle the just measure now and leave the indefensi- 
ble measure to be settled by time, and then you can meet it with 
argument alone, without its receiving the support of a just and 
proper measure. 

I will not take up time further with reference to the impor- 
tance of Hawaii as a matter of defense, of our coast, nor shall I 
enter at any length upon the commercial advantages of the 
Hawaiian Islands. All that has been ably covered by the chair- 
man of the committee and by other speakers. I simply wish to 
urge that the question of Hawaiian annexation and Philippine 
annexation should not be yoked together. I wish to urge the 
view that growth does not necessarily lead to decline. 

We are told that the insular possessions of England are to-day 
her greatest weakness; that her colonies are sources of weakness 
rather than of strength. Imagine the history of that country had 
it remained content within its narrow insular boundaries. " The 
only career that such a nation can follow is one of colonial expan- 
sion. You may say to her, "Cut off the Indies; cutoff Canada; 
cut off your African possessions." Imagine how quickly she 
would die. Historians hereafter may declare that England died 
as a result of undue growth, of phenomenal growth, of territorial 
expansion; but history will also record that she lived nobly. 

We wish that this country should live nobly, that it should pur- 
sue the high purposes with which it started out, the purpose of 
establishing within our domain as far as possible a homogeneous, 
independent, self-respecting people, capable of war, but inclined 
to peace; pursuing all the methods that will secure peace; remov- 
ing from our continent by peaceful negotiations European nations 
whose proximity threatened continued complications; removing 
all restraints upon trade between these great States, and securing 
also such insular territory as is necessary to protect its defensive 
line, securing the outposts against foreign occupation, placing be- 
tween this country and the great military countries vast expanses 
of ocean, controlling the insular outposts, and thus securing scien- 
tific boundaries, which in themselves will secure lasting peace. 
[Loud applause.] 

[See map, next page, and appendix.] 

3432 



APPENDIX. 



[Extracts from statements of General Schofield and Admiral Walker.] 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

Tuesday, May 10, 1898. 

The Committee on Foreign Affairs this day met, Hon. R. R, 
Hitt in the chair. 

Gen. J. M. Schofield and Admiral John G. "Walker appeared be- 
fore the committee. 

The Chairman. The committee will bear in mind that they 
gave informal instrnctions to the chairman to request the presence 
of General Schofield and Admiral Walker at this meeting of the 
committee, when resolution 259 will be before them for considera- 
tion by an order already made. Those gentlemen are present, and 
I will ask General Schofield if he will be kind enough, to give the 
committee such views and information as he can as will enlighten 
them in the consideration of this joint resolution providing for 
annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States; and the 
reason we have sent for you was on account of the personal ex- 
perience you have had on your part to some extent, and also your 
character as a soldier and commander of the Army for a long 
time. 

statement of gen. j. m. schofield, united states army. 

General Schofield. Mr. Chairman, I presume that members 
of the committee are familiar with the general ideas which have 
been advanced for many years by military and naval men in re- 
gard to the value of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. 
I will therefore be as brief as possible, so as not to repeat what 
has been so often said before; but first, to show the interest that 
we have always taken in the subject, I wish simply to recall the 
tfact that I, in company with General Alexander, one of the most 
distinguished engineer officers of the Army at that time, went to 
the islands twenty-five years ago at our own instance, or rather 
we got confidential orders at our requestto go there and investi- 
gate the subject, so we might be thoroughly convinced in our 
own minds, and so far as practical convince the Government, of 
the importance of the matter. 

We spent three months on the island and made a careful survey 
of Pearl River Harbor and visited the other islands, and obtained 
the knowledge that that was the only harbor in the islands to be 
considered in respect to military and naval matters, and we found 
it to be of exceedingly great value. Its natural adaptability to 
naval purposes is perhaps not surpassed by any harbor in the world. 
In regard to its secure anchorage for large fleets, its distance from 
the sea makes it beyond the reach of the guns of war ships, and 
the great ease with which the entrance to the harbor could be 
defended by mounting batteries so as to make it a perfectly safe 
refuge for marine shipping or naval cruisers, or even a fleet which 
might find it necessary under any circumstances to take refuge 
3132 15 



16 

there; for coaling grounds, for navy-yard repair shops, storehouses 
and everything of that kind. 

The most important feature of all is that it economizes the naval 
force rather than increases it. It is capable of absolute defense 
by shore batteries; so a naval fleet, after going there and replen- 
ishing its supplies and making what repairs are needed, can go 
away and leave the harbor perfectly safe to the protection of the 
Army. Then arises at once the question why this harbor will be 
of consequence to the United States. It has not been easy to make 
that perfectly clear to the minds of men who have not made such 
subjects the study of a lifetime till now; but the conditons of the 
present war, it seems to me, ought to make it clear to everybody. 
Let us take 

Mr. Clark. Would you rather proceed and say all you have to 
say and then be questioned, or do you prefer that we should put 
the questions as you proceed? 

General Schofield. I have no objections to questions being 
asked as I go along. 

Mr. Clark. Does not the very fact 

Mr. Newlands. Do you not think that it would make the re- 
marks of the General more consecutive if he should be allowed to 
proceed without interruption? 

Mr. Clark. I asked his preference in regard to the matter. 

General Schofield. It is entirely immaterial to me. 

Mr. Newlands. My observation is that it has always exnedited 
a hearing of this kind. 

General Schofield. It is entirely as you please. At this mo- 
ment the Government is fitting out quite a large fleet of steamers 
at San Francisco to carry large detachments of troops and mili- 
tary supplies of all kinds to the Philippine Islands. Honolulu is 
almost in the direct route. That fleet, of course, will want very 
much to recoal at Honolulu, thus saving that amount of freight 
and tonnage for essential stores to be carried with it. Otherwise 
they would have to carry coal enough to carry them all the way 
from San Francisco to Manila and that would occupy a large 
amount of the carrying capacity of the fleet, and if they recoal at 
Honolulu all that will be saved. More than that, a fleet is liable 
at any time to meet with stress of weather, or perhaps a heavy 
storm, and there might be an accident to the machinery which 
will make it necessary to put into the nearest port possible for 
repairs and additional supplies. By the time it reaches there its 
coal supply might be well-nigh exhausted; it then has to replen- 
ish its coal supply to carry it to whatever port it could reach. 

If I am not misinformed in regard to the laws of neutrality, the 
supply of coal that can be taken on board at neutral ports is only 
sufficient to bring it back to the nearest home port, and not enough 
to carry it across the ocean, so that if we had' to regard Honolulu 
as a neutral port we could only load up coal enough to bring us 
back to San Francisco; and if I am misinformed in regard to that 
point, why, Admiral Walker will correct me. Now, let us sup- 
pose, on the other hand, that the Spanish navy in the Pacific, as 
well as in the Atlantic, or both, were a little stronger than ours, 
instead of being somewhat weaker. The first thing they would 
do would be to go and take possession of the Sandwich Islands 
and make them the basis of naval operations against the Pacific 
coast. 

You have only to consider the state of mind which exists all along 



17 

the Atlantic coast under the erroneous apprehension that the Span- 
ish fleet might possibly assail our coast to see what will be the case 
if the Spanish fleet were a good deal stronger than ours and took 
possession of Honolulu and made it a basis of operation in attack- 
ing the points on the Pacific coast. We would be absolutely pow- 
erless, because we would have no fleet there to dispute the posses- 
sion of the Sandwich Islands, whereas, if we held that place and 
fortified it so that a foreign navy could not take it, it could not 
operate against the Pacific coast at all, for it can not bring coal 
enough across the Pacific Ocean to sustain an attack on the Pacific 
coast. Then the Sandwich Islands would be a base for naval op- 
erations, just as Puerto Rico is against the Atlantic coast. If Spain 
is strong enough to hold Puerto Rico, so that a squadron can 
replenish with supplies, coal, ammunition, and provisions there, 
the whole Spanish fleet can raid our Atlantic coast at will. 

It happens that in this war we have picked out the only nation 
in the world that is a little weaker than ourselves. The Spanish 
fleet on the Asiatic station was the only one of all the fleets we 
could have overcome as we did. Of course, that can not again 
happen, for we will not be able to pick up so weak a fellow next 
time. We are liable at any time to get into a war with a nation 
which has a more powerful fleet than ours, and it is of vital im- 
portance, therefore" if we can, to hold the point from which they 
can conduct operations against our Pacific coast. Especially is 
that true until the Nicaragua Canal is finished, because we can 
not send a fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Wc can not send 
them around Cape Horn and repel an attack there. If we had the 
canal finished, we would be very much better off than now in 
that respect, but even then we would want the possession of a 
base very much from which no power on earth except England 
can carry on a war against us. 

They have Esquiniault and other places which would be a base 
of operations against us if it were possible that there could be a 
war between us. Still, the islands would be of very great value 
to them, being on a direct line of communication between Van- 
couver and their possessions in the southwest, but they do not need 
it in the sense that other nations do. Germany, France, and any 
of those nations would jump at the chance to get the Sandwich 
Islands, while they all recognize our preemption. We got a pre- 
emption title to those islands through the volunteer action of our 
American missionaries who went there and civilized and Chris- 
tianized those people and established a Government that has no 
parallel in the history of the world considering its age, and we 
made a preemption which nobody in the world thinks of disput- 
ing, provided we perfect our title. If we do not perfect it in due 
time we have lost those islands. Anybody else can come in and 
undertake to get them. 

So it seems to me the time is now ripe when this Government 
should do that which has been in contemplation from the begin- 
ning as a necessary consequence of the first action of our people 
in going there and settling those islands and establishing a good 
government and education and the action of our Government 
from that time forward on every suitable occasion in claiming the 
right of American influence over those islands, absolutely exclud- 
ing any other foreign power from any interference, and especially 
as the result of the unanimous report from General Alexander 
and myself that steps ought to be taken in due time to secure this 

3432—2 



18 

harbor. We found annexation could not be talked of on account 
of the then existing government. "We thought it wise to advise 
the government to take such steps as would secure for us the bene- 
fit of the use of that harbor, because that is the thing that is val- 
uable to us; we do not care about the rest. All the rest is merely 
incidental to the necessity on the part of this Government to pos- 
sess that harbor and to fortify it for military and naval purposes. 

Of course this subject may be extended indefinitely— the value 
of that harbor as a place of refuge in time of war for merchant 
ships which might be pursued by cruisers, or a place of refuge to 
replenish the supplies of our own cruisers. They are of infinite 
value to the United States, or to any country which may oppose 
them in these islands for such purposes, but the great military 
point is the one I made twenty-five years ago, and I have not 
ceased to insist upon it at all proper times from that time to this, 
that to guard our Pacific coast against the possibility of a naval 
power taking possession of those islands, making them a base of 
operations against our Pacific coast, the one thing necessary to be 
done is for the United States to acquire them, improve that har- 
bor, fortify it, and make it perfectly secure and hold it forever. 

The Chairman. To acquire the whole islands? 

General Schofield. To acquire so much as may be necessary 
for the purpose. That is a political question which I have not 
thought necessary to dwell upon. I do not see how you can own 
and command that harbor without having some claim over the 
islands. 

Mr. Newlands. You have spoken thus far of the importance of 
this harbor; would it be sufficient to have the harbor without the 
islands themselves? 

General Schofield. That is the point we are just raising. That 
is a political question which perhaps I ought not to discuss. My 
own impression is we ought to have the islands for the purpose of 
holding the harbor; otherwise if these islands were left free and 
neutral to conduct their own political relations with foreign na- 
tions, we would necessarily, soOner or later, come into complica- 
tions. We must either allow foreign nations to exact from them 
the damages which such nations are in the habit of exacting from 
everybody who does not regard their interests and rights — you 
hear every day of Great Britain and Germany sending war ships 
to compel people to comply with their demands. We can not 
guard the islands against that sort of trouble unless they belong 
to us. If they belong to us, we conduct the foreign relations for 
the islands and settle any dispute which exists with a foreign na- 
tion instead of leaving a weak little Republic to do it. 

» . * * * -jf- ■» * 

Mr. Williams. Let us go back a moment. Suppose we owned 
the harbor and fortified it, with the right of sovereignty over the 
harbor— that is the supposition I made— and sufficient surround- 
ing land to protect the fortifications of the harbor, which I under- 
stand we do have. Now, how could any foreign power land at the 
main island of Hawaii or any of the Hawaiian Islands and threaten 
our possession of the harbor? Where would they land? 

General Schofield. They could land troops anywhere at Hono- 
lulu Harbor, especially if the population were friendly to them. 
Suppose the Japanese, for instance, succeeded in getting that for 
which they are working so hard now, the political possession of 
the islands and physical possession— because all the emigrants 
3133 



19 

from Japan there are soldiers — in a very few years Japan can get 

physical and political control of the islands 

. Mr. Williams. But my supposition was, if we had announced 
to the world our guaranty of the independence of the islands 

General Schofield. We can not do that 

Mr. Williams (continuing). And our firm determination to 
maintain that. If that announcement were made, do you, as a 
military man, think that the Japanese Empire would undertake to 
defy that announcement and make an attack upon those islands? 

General Schofield. I do not doubt it for a moment. They 
would first populate the island with Japanese and get control of 
the Government. They would have two or three hundred thou- 
sand Japanese there thoroughly loyal to Japan — as much so as 
Americans are to the United States. What good would our guar- 
anty of independence be against such a population? 

Mr. Williams. You do not understand me. They might have 
the local government of Japanese people; I grant that. 

General Schofield. Suppose those people there, in accordance 
with the doctrines of the American Government, were to organ- 
ize a government and ask admission into the Japanese Empire. 
Could we resist it? 

Mr. Williams. If we announced for military and naval reasons 
that we would guarantee the independence of those people, we 
would resist it to-day. 

General Schofield. Our announcement would be laughed at 
by the governments of the world, because we have not done the 
things necessary to maintain that guaranty. 

******* 

Mr. Newlands. You have spoken of the importance of our 
holding these islands with a view of preventing any other nation 
from taking them and making them a basis of attack upon our 
Pacific coast. Let me ask you whether there would be any disad- 
vantages to our country arising from the Sandwich Islands being 
absolutely neutral in any war? 

General Schofield. Oh, unquestionably; we would lose all the 
privileges we are enjoying now, the right to use them as a hos- 
pitable harbor for our own purposes. If they were to become ab- 
solutely neutral, we would not be at liberty to coal or get supplies 
there. The advantage to-day of the friendly attitude instead of a 
neutral attitude existing in the Sandwich Islands is going to be 
very great to us. 

Mr. Newlands. You think simply a neutral attitude in the 
Sandwich Islands would be disadvantageous to our country? 

General Schofield. Yes, because other nations would enjoy 
just the same privileges we do. 

****** * 

Mr. Newlands. Do you think a greater international embar- 
rassment would arise from a protectorate of those islands than 
an ownership? 

General Schofield. I would not look at a protectorate. I think 
we should have absolute control of the foreign policy of thoso 
islands. 

Mr. Newlands. But with reference to international complica- 
t ons or embarrassments, would you regard our strongest position 
as one of a protectorate or annexation? 

■ General Schofield. Annexation, by all means. I would not 
listen to a proposition for a protectorate at all, for the reason that 
you would not be able to control their foreign policy. They will 
3132 



20 

commit acts that will be regarded as objectionable by other 
nations, and we will have to say to a great naval power which 
wants to go in and enforce its terms, " No, you shall not do it." 

« * * * * i't -;:• 

Mr. Newlands. There is just one further question I would 
like to ask you. You have dwelt at great length on the advan- 
tage which the Sandwich Islands would be to a foreign country at 
war with us, in attacking us upon the Pacific coast. Will you 
state what embarrassment would arise to us from a neutral posi- 
tion of the Sandwich Islands in such a war? 

General Schofield. They would simply deprive us of the use of 
those islands for military or naval purposes, and we could not 
have a place of refuge, for instance, for our fleet or merchant 
ships. A neutral port there would be of no advantage to us, and 
we would have great deprivation if we could control the com- 
merce of the Pacific Ocean by our cruisers, as I presume we can. 
We ought to be able in any foreign war to control those islands 
and control the commerce of the Pacific Ocean, provided we have 
a depot for our cruisers to refit and resupply themselves, etc. In 
other words, for the purpose of military control of commerce we 
want very much that depot. 

Mr. Newlands. An objection urged to the acquisition of these 
islands is that it would very largely increase the Navy? 

General Schofield. That is absolutely untrue. It is the re- 
verse of the fact, as it would have the tendency to diminish the 
Navy in the Pacific because of the control of these islands. 

Mr. Newlands. Would the military expense be large in forti- 
fying those islands? 

General Schofield. No, sir; compared with the general ex- 
penses of the Army and Navy of the United States. 

Mr. Newlands. From an economical point of view, in a war, 
would you regard the holding of these islands as an advantage? 

General Schofield. Oh, very great, very great. It would cost 
us very much less to carry on war in the Pacific Ocean if we hold 
these islands than if we did not have them. The difference would 
be far greater than any possible cost of holding and fortifying 
them. 

Mr. Adams. Has any estimate been made of the probable ex- 
pense of fortifying Pearl Harbor? 

General Schofield. No. I would rather leave that to the en- 
gineers; but it is not very great, a few hundred thousand dollars, 
perhaps. It is peculiarly easy to fortify. You only have to have 
fortifications on each side of this comparatively narrow channel. 
****** -::- 

Mr. Williams. If we were strong enough to hold the islands 
and prevent a successful attack by any power, would not we be 
strong enough to defend our Government from the same power? 

General Schofield. I think that does not follow at all. The" 
holding of the islands so that a foreign navy can not get posses- 
sion of them absolutely paralyzes that navy as against the Pacific 
coast, so that the problem of war would be reduced to holding the 
islands instead of defending the whole line of the Pacific coast. 

Mr. Williams. I will put the question in another shape. If we 
owned those islands our holding them for any great length of time 
would depend upon our sea power? 

General Schofield. Yes; we can not hold anything without 
sea power. 
3432 



21 

Mr. Williams. It would necessarily come down to the question 
of sea power after all. If our sea power was sufficient to hold 
them, then our sea power would be sufficient to protect ourselves 
from the naval attacks of an enemy? 

General Schopield. I beg your pardon. The difference is this: 
The holding of the islands— if we have possession and fortify them, 
our sea power would be reenf orced by enormous land power there. 
In other words, an enemy, in order to get a basis from which to 
attack us at all, either on sea or shore, would have to come to 
those islands there— they would have to attack the perfected mod- 
ern fortifications. 

Mr., Williams. Do you presuppose the population of the islands 
friendly to us or unfriendly? 

General Schofield. I suppose them to be friendly, and that 
they would therefore assist us in their defense. 

Mr. Williams. That, I say, is predicated largely upon the as- 
sumption that they will be friendly? 

General Schofield. Yes; and that is the great value of annexa- 
tion as compared with neutrality or something worse. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOHN G. WALKER, UNITED STATES NAVY. 

The Chairman. Admiral Walker, the gentlemen of the com- 
mittee have requested you to be present that they may have the 
aid of your views and information as a seaman touching the ques- 
tion involved in the resolution before them providing for the an- 
nexation of the Hawaiian Islands, and we will be glad to have 
you state your views in such manner as may suit you. 

Admiral Walker. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the com- 
mittee, it seems to me that General Schofield has covered the gen- 
eral ground very well, and perhaps it would be better for mem- 
bers of the committee to ask me any questions they please at once. 
I agree with General Schofield entirely in his general statement 
of the value of the islands to the United States. 

Mr. Dinsmore. Then, if I may be permitted, I would like to 
ask the Admiral especially to explain to the committee— it may 
be others understand it, but I would like to have him explain to 
us the situation there from a military standpoint, and what would 
have to be done in case we take possession of the islands; what 
fortifications and what works we would have to construct, and 
what force he thinks would be sufficient to be placed there. 

Admiral Walker. Pearl Harbor is now a large lagoon, prac- 
tically surrounded by land. There is a narrow entrance, and 
outside of this entrance a coral reef extends around the island out- 
side of this lagoon and makes a bar, preventing a vessel entering 
the harbor which draws over 10 or 12 feet of water, I can not say 
exactly. I was out there in 1894, and I took up the idea that 
there must be a break in that coral reef somewhere, which, if 
found, probably an entrance could b3 easily made, and I was led 
to that belief from the fact that they had deepened the entrance 
to Honolulu Harbor quite easily. I put a party of officers and 
men at work, and they were seven weeks on that bar. They ex- 
amined the oar very carefully and found exactly what I expected 
they would find, a fissure in the reef, which was filled with fine 
coral sand— disintegrated coral. They bored it out, inside and 
outside, to determine its width. 

We found we could come down without the slightest trouble as 
deep as we wanted to go; but this is fine sand, which can be 

3432 



22 

sucked off with a suction dredge with the greatest ease. That en- 
trance through the reef was in its narrowest part about 500 feet, 
as I recollect. When that should be opened, which could be done 
at small expense, it would leave an entrance varying, say, from 
800 or 1,000 feet to 500, every inch -of which would be covered by 
the guns placed in the fortifications on the beach; and it would 
not be a straight channel: it would be a curved channel, and by 
means of mines and a few guns on the beach all the navies in the 
world could be stopped from entering in there. 

* * * * * * * 

Mr. Newlands. How large is that lagoon inside the coral reef? 

Admiral Walker. It is very large, and cut up by points and 
islands so it is very smooth water, always as smooth as the water 
of the Potomac here, and it is entirely secure as an anchorage. 
There is plenty of depth of water. 

Mr. Williams. How deep is it? 

Admiral Walker. You could always get 6, 7, or 8 fathoms of 
water; all the water a ship wants. 

The Chairman. Will you state the comparative value of the 
Sandwich Islands as a point compared to any other islands which 
lie in the Pacific Ocean near to or far from our Pacific coast? 

Admiral Walker. I consider the Sandwich Islands worth far 
more than all the others put together. The Sandwich Islands, if 
occupied by an enemy with a fleet, would be a thorn in our side. 

The Chairman. It is the isolation of the Sandwich Islands 
from any near neighbor which contributes to its importance? 

Admiral Walker. That contributes to its importance, of course. 
There is no other in the North Pacific that would be of use. When 
I speak of the North Pacific, I speak of the American side. There 
is nothing of any use except the Sandwich Islands. 

Mr. Cousins. How much would it cost to make the Sandwich 
Islands impregnable to a fleet such as composes a first-class power 
now? 

Admiral Walker. It is not at all probable that any power 
would send a very heavy fleet out there, as it is a long way from 
Europe. 

Mr. Cousins. It is presumed that would be their business to 
Bend one there. How much would it cost to fortify this harbor? 

Admiral Walker. That is a question I could not answer. It 
would not be very heavy of making fortifications for Pearl Har- 
bor so it could not be taken at all, and the only other secure land- 
ing place would be at Honolulu, which is from 7 to 10 miles away, 
and it is perfectly easy to fortify that sufficient!} 7 to prevent any- 
body from landing there. 

Mr. Berry. It would cost less than to build a battle ship now? 

Admiral Walker. Yes. 

Mr. Pearson. I suppose half a million to deepen it and half a 
million more to build fortifications? 

Admiral Walker. I can not speak as an engineer as to the 
fortifications. I should think a half millicn would put up all the 
fortifications we would want there. 

Mr. Newlands. Suppose in this war the Spanish Government 
had a navy equal to or perhaps superior to ours and should take 
possession of the Hawaiian Islands and menace us from that point 
by offensive warfare against the Pacific coast. How would they 
make that warfare effective as against our commerce on that 
coast, and what precautions would we have to adopt to meet it? 



23 

Admiral Walker. Without the Sandwich Islands ^hey could 
not operate successfully against our coast at all, because the ques- 
tion of neutrality would cut them off from both the British do- 
minions north of us and Mexico south of us; but with the Sandwich 
Islands in their possession they could establish a depot of coal 
and supplies at the Sandwich Islands, and ships would pass back- 
ward and forward as they pleased. 

Mr. Newlands. Would it prove very destructive to our com- 
mercial marine in that case? 

Admiral Walker. If they had force enough. If they were 
superior to us in force, why they would wipe out the merchant 
marine from the Pacific coast entirely. 

Mr. Newlands. What precautions would we have to adopt in 
order to meet that? 

Admiral Walker. We would need a very much larger navy 
than we would otherwise need on that coast. 

Mr. Newlands. We would need a navy to protect our coast; 
that would be required along the entire line of our coast, as well 
as Alaska? 

Admiral Walker. Yes; we would need a greater number of 
fortifications; we would need fortified places that perhaps would 
not be fortified otherwise. 

# * # * * # * 

Mr. Newlands. But I am putting a supposed case that their 
navy was equal or perhaps superior to ours, and I want to ask 
what precautions we would have to take in order to meet an of- 
fensive warfare waged upon that coast. Now, for instance, we 
have these vessels leaving Alaska just about this time with gold 
for San Francisco. 

Admiral Walker. They would have to be convoyed in force 
sufficient to secure safety. 

Mr. Newlands. By United States vessels? 

Admiral Walker. By vessels of war. 

Mr. Newlands. And you say additional fortifications would be 
required on the Pacific coast? 

Admiral Walker. Otherwise the Spaniards could land where 
they pleased out of the range of fortifications. Of course, the 
coast of California is a long coast, and it could be raided like any 
other coast. 

Mr. Newlands. So we would have to increase not only the 
military expense, but the naval expense, in order to protect that 
coast? 

Admiral Walker. Yes. 

Mr. Newlands. You say they could not operate far 

* * * # j;: t? * 

Admiral Walker. Not unless they had a base. 

Mr. Newlands. Is there any island on the Atlantic Ocean so 
important 011 the Atlantic coast as those islands are on the Pacific 
coast? 

Admiral Walker. No; I do not think so. 

Mr. Adams. In your judgment it would cost less and take fewer 
troops to protect the Pacific coast with the possession of the Ha- 
waiian Islands than without them? 

Admiral Walker. Yes. 

Mr. Adams. Because, to my mind, that is the great economic 
point of the whole question. 
3433 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 



019 944 342 2 



24 

Admiral Walker. I suppose we could take the Hawaiian Is- 
lands and fortify them for less money than it would take to build 
one battle ship. 

Mr. Cousins. Suppose you have the Hawaiian Islands thor- 
oughly fortified so they are impregnable so far as any fleet is con- 
cerned owned by any other power, and the inhabitants thereof 
should become suddenly dissatisfied with the government that 
then existed and they should take charge of these fortifications, 
how would you get them? 

Admiral Walker. I take it for granted that we should have 
garrisons in those fortifications— a small garrison — and, knowing 
the people of the Hawaiian Islands as well as I do, I have not the 
slightest idea they would ever become dissatisfied to any such ex- 
tent as that. 

Mr. Cousins. Are you pretty well acquainted with the inhabit- 
ants of Hawaii? 

Admiral Walker. I have been out there at different periods. 
I was out there lorty-five years ago, and I was out there four 
years ago. 

Mr. Newlands. You do not think the people of those islands 
would regard this as an oppressive Government? 

Admiral Walker. No. 

******* 

Mr. Williams. I understood you to say in your opinion we 
would require a less navy for the defense of the Pacific coast or 
on the Pacific seas if we owned Hawaii than if we did not. If we 
owned Hawaii, would not we bring ourselves nearer the point of 
attack instead of removing ourselves farther from one? 

Admiral Walker. I do not think so. 

******* 

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